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COMMENT

A COMMENTARY TO MONTSERRAT
GUIBERNAU NATIONS WITHOUT STATES:

POLITICAL COMMUNITIES IN
THE GLOBAL AGE
INTRODUCTION

In her notable paper, Montserrat Guibernau correctly states that the
concept of what comprises a nation is highly complex and problematic,
susceptible to "multifarious definitions" about which there is much disagreement among scholars and policy makers.' Yet, in crafting her own
definition of a nation without a State, Guibernau does little to clarify this
murky state of affairs.
Guibernau's definition of a nation without a State consists of six typological elements. First, she states that the "the members of a nation
lacking a State of their own regard the State containing them as alien." 2
This element implies not only a foreign relationship between the communities, but also one of hostility and conflict. Next, the definition
requires that the people of the stateless nation "share a sense of national
identity generally based upon a common culture [and] history.' 3 These
two factors assume that culture and history are shared homogeneously
across the entire community. Fourth, the definition requires that the people share "attachment to a particular territory."4 Again, this element
assumes homogeneity, as well as cultural significance of the land in
question. Finally, Guibernau proffers that the stateless community must
have "the explicit wish to rule themselves," which she defines as independence involving sovereign powers of "foreign and economic policy,
defense and constitutional matters."5 Implicit in this element is, of
course, the assumption that the people of the nation without a State uniformly desire to form a separate State, independent of their alien host.
We argue that Guibernau's definition is a static classification, based
on overly broad assumptions, which fails to take into account the inherent evolving nature of a nation without a State. Not only is her definition
imprecise, but when considered critically, it actually excludes at least
1.
Monserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global
Age, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1251 (2004).
2.
Id. at 1254.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at 1254-55.
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one of the examples she presents. In addition, her definition excludes a
settled example of a nation without a State, which she fails to consider in
her analysis.
THE CASE OF SCOTLAND

Guibernau discusses Scotland as an example of a nation without a
State that has achieved some measure of both cultural recognition and
political autonomy.6 However, according to at least four of the six dimensions of her definition, Scotland does not appear to qualify as a
stateless nation. Scots do not consider themselves alienated from the rest
of the United Kingdom; it has been said that "being Scottish and being
British is the norm in Scotland."7 Indeed, the union of Scotland and England in the early eighteenth century-and the concurrent loss of
Scotland's independent statehood-was made possible in part because of
the lack of strong cultural distinctions between the English and the lowland Scots.8 On the other hand, Scotland itself is, and always has been,
extremely diverse. The traditional clear-cut division of the country into
Highlands and Lowlands is based on key differences among Scots in
matters of ancestry, tradition, language, religion, and social and political
structure. For example, Highlanders of the mountainous regions of
northern Scotland, descended from the indigenous Picts, traditionally
speak Gaelic, follow the Catholic religion, and adhered to a clan system
of self-rule. 9 The Lowlanders of southern Scotland and the border regions, descended from mixed Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic heritage,
traditionally speak English, follow the Presbyterian religion, and adhered
to a feudal system of governance." Although such differences are historical in origin and have blurred over time, Scotland remains very
diverse in its attitudes and beliefs. Such differences have tended to dilute
the notion of a common Scottish national identity and have served as a
rallying cry for the significant number of Scots who oppose Scottish
self-governance." Thus, Scotland fails to satisfy the alienation, cultural
homogeneity, historical homogeneity, and uniform desire for independence prongs of Guibernau's definition of a stateless nation. Yet there can
be little doubt of the ideological existence of Scotland as a nation, with
or without a State.
6.

Id. at 1259.

7.

DAVID MCCRONE, UNDERSTANDING SCOTLAND 192 (2d ed. 2001).

8.

See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1996).

9.

See THOMAS MARTIN DEVINE, THE SCOTTISH NATION, 1700-2000 (1999).

10.

See id.

11.

See MCCRONE, supra note 7, at 192-93, 149-174.
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NATIVE AMERICANS

Guibernau's definition not only excludes Scotland as a nation without a State, but she ignores what is arguably the seminal case in the
West-Native Americans. Though she does mention the plight of indigenous peoples when discussing Quebec, she chooses not to analyze
the issue." Perhaps this avoidance was strategic, as Indians do not fit
neatly within her definition of a nation without a State. In fact, Indians
fail to fully satisfy at least four of her six definitional elements.
First, it would be hard to argue that Native Americans regard the
United States as an alien host State. The very term "Native American"
symbolizes the dual nature of Native people, including their distinct multidimensional national identities. Indians participate in all facets of U.S.
society, even choosing to enlist and fight in the country's armed forces.
For instance, a Native American Lori Piestewa was the first female soldier killed in the Iraq War. 3 And during World War II, the legendary
Native "Code Talkers" invented a decisive military code that the Japanese never broke. 14 Hence, there is scant evidence to support the notion
that Indians consider the United States as alien.
Second, one might concede that Native Americans share a common
culture and history, at least if one takes a panoptic historical view (there
is patently extensive cultural and historical heterogeneity among Tribes).
Even so, there is little evidence to show that Indians remain attached to
particular territories. Guibernau's underlying intent in naming this element seems grounded in Radin's personhood theory of property, which
is the notion that the significance of property is a function of its position
in a social context. 5 For Native Americans, such an attachment to land
likely existed during the pre-colonization period, but following the period of Indian removal (1814-1858), 16 this attachment ceased to exist.
Yet it seems dubious to assert that Tribes' failure to maintain attachment
to a particular territory lessens their status as a nation without a State.
Finally, Guibernau argues that members of a nation without a State
have a desire for self-rule. This factor is partially descriptive of Native

12.
13.

Guibemau, supra note 1, at 1265.
First American Female and Native Soldier Killed in Iraq War is Remembered,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Apr. 11, 2003, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfm?id=10500725108&CFID-2463188&CFTOKEN-93733443 (last visited Nov. 7,
2004).
14.
MARGARET T. BIXLER, WINDS OF FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE NAVAJO CODE
TALKERS OF WORLD WAR 11 (1992).
15.
Richard T. Ford, Book Review, 48 STAN L. REv. 217, 223 (1995) (reviewing
Margaret JANE RADIN, FACTS AND VALUES IN PRAGMATISM AND PERSONHOOD (1993)).
16.
See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND His INDIAN WARS (2002).
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Americans, whose Tribes often claim sovereign status.'7 How far their
sovereign power extends is a question beyond the scope of this analysis,
but it is reasonable to allege that not all Native communities promulgate
identical claims regarding the extent of their sovereignty. The key point
is that to fit within the confines of Guibernau's definition, "tribal governments must be able and willing to accept the responsibility of
governing."' 8 In short, there are in excess of 500 federally-recognized
U.S. Indian Tribes,'9 and they are neither all willing to assume an equivalent amount of governing responsibility, nor are they all capable of the
same level of governmental functioning. Still, this intra-tribal selfdeterminative heterogeneity does not imply that some Tribes are more
deserving of the status of a nation without a State. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights correctly holds that self-determination depends
on the will of the people, 2° and in the case of Indians, there can be a variety of factors that lead Tribes to pursue different sovereignty goals.
Thus, Native Americans fail to satisfy the alienation, distinct national identity, attachment to a particular territory, and uniform desire for
independence prongs of Guibernau's nation without a State definition.
Moreover, it is questionable whether Indians meet the cultural and historical heterogeneity prongs; this determination requires further
elucidation from Guibernau regarding her level of analysis. Nonetheless,
one can hardly doubt that domestic Tribes like the Cherokee, Seminole,
Choctaws, Creeks, and Chickasaws qualify as nations without a State.

CONCLUSION

Guibernau makes a laudable attempt to define a nation without a
State. In fact, her paper culminates with an analysis of the major dilemmas facing the nation without a State: addressing internal diversity;
avoiding violence as a means of creating change; and controlling the
drive to create expensive bureaucracy. Nonetheless, these recommendations fail to aid the majority of communities that one would consider to
be stateless nations because these communities do not fall within the
17.
Robert A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights: Are they
Historical Illusions?, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 141 (1995-1996); see also David E. Wilkins,
Indigenous Nations as Reserved Sovereigns, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 13, 2003, at Perspectives, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1055516194
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2004).
18.
Fairbanks, supra note 17, at 144.
19.
Bureau of Indian Affairs Home Page, U.S. Department of the Interior, at
http://www.doi.gov/bureau-indian-affairs.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
20.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, art.
21(3), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), availableat http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
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narrow confines of her definition. For instance, it is unclear whether
Scotland or Native America would consider these dilemmas as major
issues; it seems unlikely.
In fact, the static definition of a nation without a State is the primary
failure in Guibernau's account. We posit that it is not feasible to define
the nation without a State-which is a fluid, evolving, and amorphous
ideological concept-by employing strict typological elements. In the
case of Scotland and Native America, one can readily discern the
changes that have occurred in these communities throughout history;
even if there was a point in time where both examples fit within Guibernau's definitional parameters, the defined construct's validity was shortlived. Employing exacting criteria within a definitional construct is best
reserved for substantive jurisprudence, such as the Montevideo Convention's requirements for statehood under international law: a permanent
population; a defined territory; a government; and capacity to enter into
relations with other States.21
In the final analysis, what defines a nation, Stateless or otherwise?
Surely it must be left to the people who comprise the community in
question to determine the answer. If the people belonging to a community understand and believe it to be a nation, and act within it as a fitting
social and cultural structure for their lives, then these individuals obviously deem that sufficient homogeneity and shared identity exists, in
whatever form or proportion, to satisfy their consciousness of unity and
kinship. Such an idea of community assuredly qualifies as a nation. And
if that nation is not constitutionally autonomous, but is situated within
the territory and/or autonomy of an existing State, then undoubtedly it
continues to qualify as a nation without a State.
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21.
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1,
165 L.N.T.S. 19.

